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Abstract
In this paper the authors analyze the existence of profit shifting between Spain and other OECD
and EU countries. Using a sample of 1,169 Spanish subsidiaries owned by foreign OECD
and EU parent companies and a sample of 317 EU subsidiaries owned by Spanish parent
companies, taken from the AMADEUS Database for the period 2005 to 2014, and a simple
tax rate difference as a measure of the tax incentive, the authors obtain a negative effect of
corporate income taxes on reported profits. When the tax rate differences between Spain and
the foreign countries vary by one percentage point, reported profits vary by approximately
2.7 to 3%. This is consistent with profit shifting activity by corporations and matches the
empirical results in the literature. Furthermore, the authors calculate the impact of this activity
on Spain’s tax revenues from the sample of Spanish subsidiary companies. They obtain that
the tax revenues vary from year to year, depending on the level of taxation of the main investor
countries in Spain in comparison to the Spanish tax rate.
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1 Introduction 
Among multinational enterprises (MNEs), profit shifting (PS) is a tax planning 
strategy within a group consisting of artificially shifting taxable income from 
entities located in high tax paying countries (basically, countries with high 
corporate income tax, CIT) to entities located in countries with lower tax rates. 
The PS phenomenon, like other tax avoidance and evasion devices, causes 
what is known as Double Non-Taxation, which refers to the minimisation and 
sometimes zero taxation of certain taxable income (or more generally, taxable 
object). Where there is PS activity, worldwide CIT revenues become lower 
because profits are taxed at low tax rates.  
Nowadays these tax minimizing activities are encouraged by the discrepancy 
between the features of today’s economy and the international taxation standards 
(based on the Separate Accounting Method) created a century ago, when inter-
national exchanges of goods and services were limited and business models were 
simpler. While the world economy is becoming ever more globalized, current 
international taxation standards require MNEs to report profits separately in the 
different jurisdictions in which they operate. This creates an opportunity for MNEs 
to develop strategies to reduce their tax burden, most of which are legally 
acceptable, because it is difficult to determine where profits are created.1 The 
digitalization of the economy, the complexity of business models and the diversity 
of tax rules in different jurisdictions (which creates tax loopholes) also make it 
easier for companies to develop these strategies. 
Two of the most popular PS mechanisms among MNEs are transfer pricing 
and thin capitalisation. Transfer prices are the prices that entities set when they 
exchange services and/or goods within the multinational group, i.e. the prices 
applicable to related-party transactions, which have to be determined as if the 
transactions were between independent enterprises, i.e., according to the arm’s 
length principle. And the term “thin capitalisation” refers to a situation in which a 
company is disproportionally financed by debt, i.e. it has a disproportionate debt to 
equity ratio according to the arm’s length principle. 
Both transfer pricing and thin capitalisation consist of declaring more revenues 
(and thus, higher profits) in the jurisdictions where tax rates are most favourable, 
_________________________ 
1 In this context, the traditional international taxation problem of double taxation may also arise. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  3 
and more deductible expenses (and thus, lower profits) in the ones where they are 
least favourable. The Transfer Pricing strategy achieves this result by manipulating 
the transfer prices according to taxes in situations in which it is difficult to assess 
the correct application of the arm’s length principle. This is usually the case when 
transactions include specific intangible assets without counterparts in the market. 
And in thin capitalisation, group companies in low tax jurisdictions, where interest 
has to be reported and taxed, lend money to their sister companies in high tax 
jurisdictions, where interest is deducted.2  
Therefore, both strategies take advantage of the difficulty of valuing 
international transactions within groups in market conditions (one manipulates 
transfer prices and the other, amounts of debt) and the different tax rules (mainly, 
tax rates) in different jurisdictions. 
Apart from Double Non-Taxation and loss of tax revenues, PS causes an 
equity problem between territories because the international movement of profits 
is not accompanied by a parallel movement of the real economic activity that 
generates such profits. As a result, companies create value in some jurisdictions, 
taking advantage of the high investment yield they provide, and report profits in 
other ones with low tax rates. This results in a transfer of economic resources from 
the territories with high CIT rates, where economic activity is carried out, to the 
ones with low CIT rates. 
In spite of these negative consequences of PS, according to Hines (2014:444-
446), its impact is limited. There is evidence that MNEs do not accomplish PS 
entirely. First, high tax countries still collect tax revenues from the CIT. Second, 
the real activity of corporations is still affected by taxes (there is a consensus on 
the subject in the empirical literature); and third, not all MNEs have affiliates 
situated in countries with the most favourable tax treatment, the tax havens. 
The reason for the containment of PS activity is the cost of such activity for 
MNEs. According to Hines (2014:450), PS produces administrative and 
compliance costs and more importantly, costs deriving from the need to change 
real activity to enable income reallocation. Although PS disassociates reported 
profits from value creation, a certain level of real economic activity in the 
territories where profits are reported is necessary to justify such reported profits.  
_________________________ 
2 Dividends (which constitute equity remuneration), as opposed to interest, cannot be deducted 
(Fatica et al., 2012). 
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Recently, some leading international institutions and governments have 
expressed concern about PS and the reduced taxes paid by some MNEs. Since the 
financial crisis and the loss of economic resources, the taxation scandals of MNEs 
have become front page news. One of the most important international initiatives 
tackling the situation is the OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) 
project, launched in 2013, with the final reports published in September 2015 
(OECD, 2015). This consists of a package of measures aimed at aligning taxation 
and value creation by driving needed changes and improvements in current 
international taxation standards. In addition to the OECD, the EU has been 
working on international taxation problems from the beginning, and is now 
developing an Action Plan on Corporate Taxation (European Commission, 2015). 
Among other measures, the EU has relaunched the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal (European Commission, 2016a and 
2016b). 
In this context, our paper sets out to test empirically the existence of artificially 
shifted profits related to Spain and to determine and assess the positive or negative 
consequences for the country in terms of tax revenue collection, i.e. if profits are 
shifted from or to Spain. Specifically, PS in or out of Spain is analysed from a 
sample of Spanish subsidiaries owned by OECD and EU parent companies, and 
from a sample of EU subsidiaries owned by Spanish parent companies. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 reviews the 
empirical literature. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology and data. 
Section 4 carries out a descriptive analysis of the sample. Section 5 presents the 
results. Section 6 accomplishes a series of additional analyses and robustness 
checks. And section 7 presents our conclusions. 
2 Review of the empirical literature on profit shifting 
There is a consensus on the existence of PS activity in the empirical literature. 
However, such a consensus does not exist with regard to the magnitude of the 
activity and the main methods used to accomplish it.  
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2.1 Proving the existence of profit shifting activity 
Two kinds of empirical approaches are used to identify the existence of PS 
activity: direct and indirect. The direct approach consists of identifying particular 
PS strategies. Examples of this kind of empirical approach can be seen in Clausing 
(2003), with regard to the transfer pricing strategy, and in Blouin et al. (2011), 
Blouin et al. (2014) or Buettner et al. (2012), regarding the thin-capitalisation 
strategy.  
The indirect approach is based on the expected results of the PS activity. The 
traditional model comes from Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice 
(1994), and rests on the assumption that corporations declare more profits in 
territories with relatively low CIT. It then postulates a negative relationship 
between profits and taxes. Although this result is found if PS activity exists, the 
same is true when companies, instead of moving their taxable income due to taxes, 
move their investments, which generate true profits. The reaction of investments to 
taxes has been widely proven by the empirical literature. 
Based on the above, the basic premise of the Hines and Rice approach is that 
MNEs’ reported profits are equal to the sum of true profits derived from real 
economic activity and profits artificially shifted (positive or negative). Therefore, 
when analysing the relationship between reported profits and taxes to prove PS, it 
is necessary to control for those explanatory variables with an impact on true 
profits of enterprises. They have usually been proxies of the inputs capital and 
labour and their productivity. 
Since Hines and Rice (1994), a great deal of empirical work has used the same 
approach. We can for example point to Huizinga and Laeven (2008) or Lohse and 
Riedel (2013). A summary can be seen in Appendix 1. Furthermore, there are 
other more recent economic and accounting indirect approaches to prove the 
existence of PS behaviour – for example, in the papers of Collins, Kemsley and 
Lang (1998); Klassen and Laplante (2012); Dyreng and Markle (2016); or 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013). A review of the indirect evidence method in 
general can be found in Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) and Dharmapala 
(2014), but the Hines and Rice approach has been the most used to date. 
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2.2 Evaluating the magnitude of profit shifting and identifying the 
main strategies used to accomplish it 
As remarked above, there is no consensus on the magnitude of the PS phenomenon 
and therefore, on the consequences in terms of tax revenue collection. However, as 
Hines (2014:444) points out, the economic consequences of the PS behaviour 
motivated by CIT cannot be very significant given that CIT amounts to a very 
small part of the total tax revenues of major economies (the same is not true for 
less developed countries). In any case, what is clear and really significant is the 
fact that there is a distributive justice problem between territories. 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) performed a meta-analysis considering all 
possible variables that could have affected the magnitude of the various results of 
25 studies based on indirect approaches, and derived a semi-elasticity of pre-tax 
profits to the international tax differential of 0.8, in absolute terms. This means 
that “reported profits decrease by about 0.8% if the international tax differential 
that can be exploited for tax arbitrage increases by 1 percentage point” 
(Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2013:2). They also obtained that non-financial 
strategies (Transfer Pricing and licensing) dominate over financial ones (thin 
capitalisation). 
On the other hand, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013:10–16) detected a series 
of methodological choices that could have affected the range of quantitative 
results. These choices refer to the proxies of the model variables (the measure of 
the companies’ profits used as a dependent variable, the tax incentive proxy, and 
the labour and capital indicators), the level of disaggregation of the data and the 
econometrics. 
With regard to the proxies used for the dependent variable it is possible to 
distinguish four kinds of measures: pre-tax profits, post-tax profits, pre-tax 
earnings and post-tax earnings. According to these authors, using earnings instead 
of profits is expected to lead to a lower magnitude of PS behaviour because of the 
exclusion of interest and thus, of the financial strategies (thin capitalisation) for 
PS. Also, the impact of CITs on profits is expected to be higher when the measure 
of the dependent variable includes taxes. 
The treatment given to the measure of the CIT incentive for PS is another 
major methodological issue. Some papers have used as a proxy for this measure 
only the tax rate of the country where profits are reported, while others (first 
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Huizinga and Laeven, 2008 and later De Simone, 2016 and Markle, 2016) have 
calculated weighted average tax rate differences considering all tax rates and 
profit-shifting opportunities throughout the territories where the MNE operates. 
Lastly, we would like to emphasize the introduction of industry fixed effects in 
the econometric specification as a way to control for the use of intangible assets. 
Some economic sectors have a high level of intangible assets (such as 
pharmaceuticals), which according to Dischinger and Riedel (2011:693), could 
have important effects on both true profits and shifted profits. Intangible assets 
usually produce a relatively high level of profits, and at the same time, make the 
Transfer Pricing strategy of MNEs easier. The prices of these assets are difficult to 
set according to the arm’s length principle because of the lack of similar 
transactions on the market (Grubert, 2003:226). Thus, companies in sectors with a 
high level of intangible assets have more opportunities to use the Transfer Pricing 
strategy to shift profits. 
3 Empirical methodology and data 
3.1 Empirical methodology 
We use the Hines and Rice indirect approach to verify the existence of PS activity 
by companies located in Spain. In addition to the basic premise of this approach 
(reported profits are equal to true profits plus shifted profits) Hines and Rice 
(1994:16) assumed that PS activity is costly. As we explained in the introduction, 
there is evidence that it is not fully performed due to such costs. In particular, 
Hines and Rice (1994) presumed that marginal costs from PS activity increase as 
the ratio of reported profits to true profits increases. 
This equation shows the main idea of the Hines and Rice approach: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖 − 𝑎2 (𝛷𝑖)2𝜌𝑖 ; (1) 
where 𝜋𝑖 are reported profits in country i, 𝜌𝑖 are true profits in country i, 𝜙𝑖 are 
profits shifted into or out of country i, and 𝑎
2
(𝛷𝑖)2
𝜌𝑖
 are total PS costs in any of the 
two-way directions, being the parameter a >0. 
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From this initial equation, the authors derived the expressions for shifted and 
true profits. On the one hand, they calculated optimal shifted profits by a MNE by 
maximising global profits net of taxes (𝑡𝑖) and PS costs, taking as fixed true 
profits.  
𝑀𝑀𝑀�(1 − 𝑡𝑖)𝑛
𝑖=1
�𝜌𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖 − 𝑀2 (𝛷𝑖)2𝜌𝑖 � 
subject to ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 ≤ 0 
(2) 
And on the other hand, they estimated true profits (which are not observable) 
from a Cobb-Douglas production function 𝑄 = 𝑐𝐴𝜀𝐿𝛼𝐾𝜙𝑒𝑢. Where A is the level 
of productivity in the local country, L is the labour input, K is the capital input, c is 
a constant term, ε, α and ϕ are the output elasticities of the respective inputs and 
the productivity, and 𝑒𝑢 is a random term. Assuming that true profits are equal to 
the production function less the labour costs, which are the wage (w) times L, and 
assuming w is equal to the marginal product of labour, they derived the following 
expression: 
𝑄 − 𝑤𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑐𝐴𝜀𝐿𝛼𝐾𝜙𝑒𝑢 (3) 
Making some substitutions and calculations to define a particular measure of 
the tax incentive variable, the authors obtained an expression in logarithms like the 
following one for analysing the existence of the PS activity:  
𝐿𝐿(𝜋𝑖) =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑙𝐿𝐾𝑖 − 𝛾(𝑇𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝐿𝑐𝑒𝐿𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖; (4) 
where 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑙𝐿𝐾𝑖 accounts for reported profits derived from 
real activity of MNEs, and γ (Tax incentive) accounts for reported profits resultant 
from their PS activity.  
Unlike Hines and Rice (1994), who used cross-section country data, our work 
is based on affiliate-level panel data. From the basic equation below, we estimate: 
𝐿𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑙𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑖 
−𝛾(𝑇𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝐿𝑐𝑒𝐿𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖) + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖; (5) 
where t  indicates the time period and the sample units i are individual companies, 
and where 𝜙𝑖 denotes subsidiary fixed effects that account for unobservable 
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characteristics constant over the period (like their know-how or their transfer 
pricing policy) and 𝜌𝑖 the time period dummies, which control for common shocks 
over the years (like the recent economic crisis).  
It is essential to know the particular definition of the tax incentive variable to 
interpret the results of the estimation correctly, taking into account the negative 
relationship between taxes and reported profits in a particular territory derived 
from the PS activity. If the tax incentive measure is the tax rate of the local 
jurisdiction where profits are reported, it is clear that PS activity should lead to 
estimating a negative effect. However, if the measure is a tax rate difference 
between territories, the interpretation depends on how the subtraction has been 
calculated. 
We use a simple tax rate difference between territories (the subsidiary and the 
MNE residence country) as a proxy for the international tax incentive to shift 
profits, in the same way as some earlier authors (Mills and Newberry, 2004; 
Clausing, 2009; Dischinger, 2010; Blouin et al., 2011; Dischinger and Riedel, 
2011; Becker and Riedel, 2012; or Dischinger et al., 2014). In particular, the 
difference between the Spanish tax rate and the respective tax rate of the OECD 
and/or EU country where the parent company of the subsidiary is situated (TES −TEX) is calculated for the sample of Spanish subsidiaries, and the difference 
between the tax rate of the EU country where the subsidiary is located and the 
Spanish tax rate is calculated for the sample of foreign subsidiaries (TEU − TES).  
Thus, we only analyse PS activity between a parent company and one of its 
subsidiaries: that located in Spain, for the sample of Spanish subsidiaries, and each 
one of the subsidiaries located in the EU, for the sample of EU subsidiaries owned 
by Spanish groups. Therefore, neither PS between parent companies and all their 
subsidiaries, nor PS between subsidiary companies is analysed (although this last 
analysis could shed also light on PS related to Spain, which is our objective).  
The indicator of the tax rates is the top statutory CIT rate3 of the countries 
(including local taxes) and the information comes from KPMG (2006) and the 
_________________________ 
3 While it is true that tax bills not only depend on the nominal tax rates but also on the definition of 
the tax bases, according to Devereux and Maffini (2007) statutory tax rates are the best indicator for 
measuring the response to taxes at this stage of the decision making of multinational corporations, 
i.e., statutory tax rates are the best indicator of the tax incentive to shift profits. As Devereux and 
Maffini (2007) asserted: “It is plausible to suppose that companies take advantage of any tax 
allowances in any jurisdiction in which they operate. Having done so, the advantage in being able to 
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KPMG website4. The expected effect of our particular tax incentive measure on 
reported profits is negative. For the sample of Spanish subsidiaries, as the Spanish 
tax rate increases (decreases) with respect to the foreign tax rate, reported profits 
in Spain should decrease (increase). And for the sample of EU subsidiaries, as the 
respective EU tax rate increases (decreases) with respect to the Spanish tax rate, 
reported profits in the EU country should decrease (increase). For the quantitative 
results, since the dependent variable (reported profits) is in logarithms and the tax 
incentive variable is in levels, γ directly gives the semi-elasticity of reported 
profits with respect to taxes. 
Apart from the affiliate financial variables and the tax incentive, the Hines and 
Rice approach includes in the model the level of productivity of the territory where 
profits are generated. The level of productivity is measured as the logarithm of the 
GDP per capita. Because of the within transformation of the model (to which we 
refer later) and the limited variability of the Spanish GDP pc over time, this 
variable has been eliminated from the estimation for the sample of Spanish 
subsidiaries. The GDP pc of the EU territories for the sample of foreign 
subsidiaries is the real GDP pc in thousands of euros and is taken from the 
Eurostat website5. 
3.2 Data 
As stated in the introduction, the objective of this study is merely to examine PS 
from or to Spain and thus, it is not possible to draw general conclusions from it 
about what happens worldwide, nor conclude that PS does not exist if no evidence 
for it is found. 
The analyses rest on two samples of companies relating to Spanish territory, 
taken from the AMADEUS database (from the Bureau Van Dijk) for the period 
from 2005 to 2014. One sample encompasses Spanish subsidiaries owned by 
OECD and/or EU parent companies, and the other encompasses EU subsidiaries 
_________________________ 
transfer a dollar of profit from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax jurisdiction depends on differences 
in the statutory rate” (p.12). 
4 http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-
table.aspx  
5 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database  
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owned by Spanish parent companies. The limitation of this second sample to the 
EU (instead of taking a symmetric sample of OECD and EU subsidiaries owned 
by Spanish parent companies) is because the AMADEUS database only provides 
financial statements and ownership data for European companies. 
For both samples we limit the analyses to non-financial subsidiaries owned by 
industrial parent companies.6 Parent companies are those denominated Global 
Ultimate Owners (GUOs) in AMADEUS. In particular, the definition we took for 
the GUOs considers a minimum percentage for the path from a subject company to 
its GUO of 25.01%. 
Moreover, we only had access to data from large and very large companies.7 
However, we consider this to have been an advantage because PS activity is 
usually carried out by this type of company. Therefore, we think the samples we 
consider are representative of the companies engaging in PS.  
Initially, the sample of Spanish subsidiary companies comprised an 
unbalanced panel of 2,212 subsidiaries and the sample of EU subsidiary 
companies one of 550. For these two samples the following unconsolidated 
financial data were downloaded: profit before income tax expense as a measure of 
the dependent variable 𝜋 (the AMADEUS variable PLBT), fixed assets as a 
measure of the input capital 𝐾 (FIAS) and cost of employees as a measure of the 
input labour L (STAF), all of them in thousands of euros.  
Following the previous literature, the annual observations of subsidiaries 
located in the same country and belonging to the same parent company were 
aggregated for each financial variable.8 We only aggregated data for years in 
which financial information was available for all the eligible subsidiaries (those in 
the same country and belonging to the same parent company). Then, we 
_________________________ 
6 According to the AMADEUS database, the category industrial companies includes all companies 
that are not banks or financial companies nor insurance companies. 
7 According to the AMADEUS database, for a company to be categorized as large or very large it 
need only fulfil one of three criteria: turnover (>=10 and >=100 million euros for large and very large 
companies, respectively), total assets (>=20 and >=200 million euros, respectively) or total number 
of employees (150 and 1,000, respectively). Moreover, AMADEUS classifies the companies’ size 
from the last available year in the database.  
8 The number of aggregated units is the same as the number of parent companies for the sample of 
Spanish subsidiaries because in this case the only subsidiaries’ country is Spain. 
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disregarded annual financial observations when data were not available for all the 
eligible subsidiaries for data consolidation. 
Lastly, once the data were brought together, observations with a non-positive 
value were eliminated from the sample in order to transform the financial variables 
to logarithms. We also eliminated observations for which no data for the 
dependent variable (PLBT) were available. 
As a result of this procedure, there are 1,169 units in the sample of Spanish 
subsidiaries, and 317 in the sample of EU subsidiaries. From now on we will call 
each of these aggregated units a subsidiary, although this is not entirely accurate.  
4 Descriptive analysis of the sample 
In the first place we looked at the series of values of our focal explanatory 
variable, the tax incentive. In the sample of Spanish subsidiaries, the number of 
times in which there is an absolute difference higher than or equal to 0.1 (which 
could be consider a high difference) is 2,076 (out of 7,294 observations). 
Moreover, this large difference exists for both sides of the distribution. The 
number of times in which the Spanish tax rate is higher than the foreign tax rate in 
0.1 points is 457 (out of 3,533 positive observations) and the number of times in 
which the Spanish tax rate is lower than the foreign tax rate in 0.1 points is 1,619 
(out of 3,761 negative observations).  
We do not find such large differences in the sample of EU subsidiaries. The 
number of times in which the foreign EU tax rate is higher than the Spanish tax 
rate in 0.1 points is 0 (out of 699 positive observations) and the number of times in 
which the respective EU tax rate is lower than the Spanish tax rate in 0.1 points is 
313 (out of 1,876 negative observations). For this sample the number of negative 
observations is much higher than the number of positive observations, which 
means that the Spanish tax rate is relatively high in comparison to the tax rate of 
the other EU countries. 
Secondly, also relating to the tax incentive variable and the sample of 
subsidiaries, Table 1 and Table 2 provide information about the number of parent 
and subsidiary companies by country for each of the samples respectively. For the 
sample of Spanish subsidiaries, Table 1 shows the OECD and EU countries 
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Table 1: Spanish subsidiary companies: Number of GUOs by country 
GUO country-ISO code- Companies   
US (United States) 282 KR (Rep. of Korea) 8 
LU (Luxembourg) 135 NO (Norway) 8 
DE (Germany) 112 AT (Austria) 6 
FR (France) 93 IL (Israel) 6 
GB (United Kingdom) 92 MT (Malta) 6 
JP (Japan) 84 AU (Australia) 5 
NL (Netherlands) 82 CY (Cyprus) 4 
IT (Italy) 52 PL (Poland) 3 
CH (Switzerland) 43 CL (Chile) 2 
BE (Belgium) 27 GR (Greece) 2 
DK (Denmark) 27 TR (Turkey) 2 
CA (Canada) 19 CZ (Czech Republic) 1 
SE (Sweden) 18 IS (Iceland) 1 
IE (Ireland) 16 NZ (New Zealand) 1 
PT (Portugal) 11 SI (Slovenia) 1 
MX (Mexico) 9 SK (Slovakia) 1 
 
Table 2: EU subsidiary companies: Number of subsidiary companies by country 
Subs. Country-ISO 
code- Companies 
Subs. Country-ISO 
code- Companies 
FR 57 GR 7 
PT 57 BG 5 
IT 47 SK 5 
GB 37 NL 4 
DE 22 SE 4 
PL 19 AT 3 
BE 14 MT 2 
CZ 14 HU 1 
RO 9 LT 1 
IE 8 LU 1 
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investing in Spain ordered according to their importance in terms of number of 
parent companies. And for the sample of EU subsidiaries, Table 2 shows the 
Spanish EU investment destination countries of the sample, ordered according to 
their importance in terms of number of subsidiary companies. These tables give an 
idea of which countries and their corresponding tax rates could be most influential 
on the results.  
Additionally Table 3 shows the number of subsidiaries by parent company for 
the sample of EU subsidiaries (owned by Spanish parent companies), which adds 
information about the higher influence of some of the Spanish parent companies 
that own EU subsidiaries to the results. 
It seems from Table 1 that United States, Luxembourg, Germany, France, 
United Kingdom and Japan are the countries with the highest number of parent 
companies owning subsidiaries located in Spain. Within them, United States, 
Germany, France and Japan have relatively high statutory CIT rates. 
From Table 2 we see that the most important EU countries for Spain in terms 
of number of subsidiaries are France, with a relatively high CIT rate, and Portugal, 
with a relatively low CIT rate.  
Table 3 shows that there is a Spanish parent company with a greater influence 
on the results: it owns nine sample subsidiaries. However, the majority of parent 
companies (143 out of 194 Spanish parent companies) have the same repre-
sentativeness in the sample because they own only one EU sample subsidiary (or 
sample unit).  
Table 3: EU subsidiary companies: Number of subsidiaries by GUO 
Number of  
GUOs 
Number of subsidiaries 
 by GUO 
1 9 
3 7 
6 6 
2 5 
4 4 
12 3 
23 2 
143 1 
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Additionally, Table 4 and Table 5 present the descriptive statistics of the basic 
model variables, and Table 6 and Table 7 the correlation matrix of the explanatory 
variables. 
Table 4: Spanish subsidiary companies: Descriptive statistics (€ thousand) 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
П 7,294 10,356.98 79,290.4 0.13 5,430,267 
K 7,242 64,002.91 314,802.8 0.14 11,900,000 
L 6,915 16,156.45 44,388.83 0.99 668,475.2 TES − TEX 7,294 -0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.25 
Table 5: EU subsidiary companies: Descriptive statistics (€ thousand) 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
П 1,876 5,432.72 23,814.16 0.54 560,693.3 
K 1,853 41,657.49 254,987.6 1.35 8,835,699 
L 1,667 7,385.66 22,129.19 1.69 339,238.8 
GDP pc 1,876 24.66 8.97 4.6 78.1 TEU − TES 1,876 -0.03 0.06 -0.22 0.05 
Table 6: Spanish subsidiary companies: Correlation matrix 
 K L TES − TEX 
K 1   
L 0.43 1  TES − TEX 0.05 0.04 1 
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Table 7: EU subsidiary companies: Correlation matrix 
 K L GDP pc TES − TEX 
K 1    
L 0.62 1   
GDP pc 0.08 0.10 1  TEU − TES 0.07 0.09 0.65 1 
5 Results 
5.1 Spanish subsidiary companies 
Panel data techniques have been used to derive the effect of the international tax 
incentive to shift profits on Spanish reported profits, since the sample of 
subsidiaries is observed for a ten-year period and there is a strong likelihood that 
there are unobservable heterogeneous characteristics among them affecting profits, 
which panel data techniques let us control for (i.e., PS policy, management policy, 
etcetera). Specifically, according to the Hausman test a Fixed Effects model was 
estimated. This method solves the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable 
features of subsidiary companies which affect reported profits to be correlated with 
observable explanatory variables. We present our results in Table 8. 
The results are in line with the empirical literature (Heckemeyer and Overesch, 
2013; Dharmapala, 2014). A negative relationship between the tax incentive to 
shift profits and reported profits arises after controlling for the inputs labour and 
capital. That corroborates that subsidiary companies located in Spain are involved 
in PS. Spanish companies report profits lower (higher) than true profits when the 
Spanish tax rate is higher (lower) than the foreign tax rate of the country where the 
parent company is located. 
Particularly, a semi-elasticity of 2.74 has been estimated, which indicates that 
if the simple tax rate difference (the Spanish tax rate minus the tax rate of the 
parent company country) increases by 10 percentage points, reported profits in 
Spain decrease by 27.40%. This means that, for example, the Spanish tax rate 
falling from 30% to 28% (a reduction of 2% points) in 2015 should have led to a 
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Table 8: Basic Results 
LnL 0.66 
(13.58)*** lnK 0.05 
(2.38)**  TES − TEX -2.74 (-4.27)*** 
N 6,890 R2 0.10 
Subsidiary FE Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Note: lnL is the logarithm of the cost of employees; lnK is the logarithm of the fixed assets; and TES − TEX is the difference between the Spanish tax rate and the tax rate of the foreign country where 
the parent company is situated. Subsidiary Fixed Effects and Year dummies are also included and 
estimations are Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations. ***, ** and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
5.48% increase in reported profits in Spain (assuming all else being equal). This is 
an estimated semi-elasticity slightly higher than that of the empirical literature, 
given the mean tax semi-elasticity of –1.78 for the group of studies using after-
financing profits summarized in Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013:29). 
Although the results are in line with the literature, at this point we would like 
to voice some concerns relating to the calculation of the tax incentive measure. As 
we stated above, our only aim is to measure PS activity from or to Spain, and 
specifically in this section PS activity between the Spanish subsidiaries and their 
respective OECD and/EU parent company, similarly to other studies that examine 
PS between parent and subsidiaries. 
In doing so, however, one should not forget that PS is an internal practice 
within a multinational group. PS between Spain and the residence country of the 
group could not be only explained by the difference in their respective tax rates, 
but also by the difference between the Spanish CIT rate and the other affiliated 
subsidiaries’ tax rates. Hence, results could be overstated or undervalued, and it 
may be necessary to control for the other affiliated companies’ tax rates. 
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Huizinga and Laeven (2008), De Simone (2016) and Markle (2016) use a 
measure of the tax incentive that captures all taxes of the countries in which the 
multinational groups operate (although they do not take into account the tax rate of 
the other affiliated companies when analysing PS between a subsidiary and its 
respective parent company,9 either). Moreover, their measure considers the 
opportunity for this activity to exist between the different affiliated companies by 
weighting the tax rates of the countries where they are situated by the level of real 
economic activity of the affiliates within their borders.  
Additionally, apart from the level of real economic activity, there may be other 
company characteristics which limit the PS activity between any affiliates of a 
group. For example, according to Huizinga and Laeven (2006), while subsidiaries 
within a group may perform similar tasks, the same is not true between 
subsidiaries and parent companies, giving greater scope for transactions and thus, 
for shifting profits. In this case, comparing the tax rate of parents and subsidiaries 
(and particularly here, a sole subsidiary) might be a good approximation of the PS 
activity between Spain and their main investment partner countries because of the 
special role of parent companies within multinational firms.  
5.2 Impact on tax revenue 
Taking the estimated semi-elasticity of the tax incentive on reported profits, we 
can perform a simple calculation of the consequences for Spain’s tax revenue of 
the disappearance of PS activity, after making some important assumptions. First, 
it is necessary to assume that the elimination of PS activity does not change the 
MNEs’ investment decisions, all else being equal. And second, that the average 
semi-elasticity is the same for all years in the sample and for any tax rate 
difference (high and low tax rate differences).  
Bearing these assumptions in mind, the difference in terms of tax revenues for 
Spain was calculated for each year between 2005 and 2014 in a similar vein to 
Clausing (2009). To that end, reported profits in absence of the distorting PS 
activity (i.e. actual or real profits derived from real economic activity) were 
_________________________ 
9 However, their analyses include several companies of the same multinational group. 
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calculated from the estimated semi-elasticity of reported profits to taxes. The 
results are shown in Table 9. 
As reflected in Table 9, it seems from our sample of Spanish subsidiary 
companies that during the period 2005-2014, Spain has both gained and lost 
revenue due to PS activity, notably in 2014, when it could have earned substantial 
additional tax revenues if PS activity had disappeared. According to our results, 
the years in which Spain would have seen a net loss from PS were 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2012 and 2014. This means that in those years reported profits in Spain were 
lower than actual profits, which is consistent with Spain’s high CIT rate during the 
three first years of the sample. A deeper analysis is needed to find the reasons 
behind the results for 2012, and especially, 2014. And the years for which reported 
profits in Spain were higher than real profits were 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 (when 
the Spanish CIT rate was reduced) and 2013. 
We do not intend to provide a general figure nor make a general assessment of 
the consequences of PS in terms of tax revenues for Spain for the whole period, for 
several reasons. In the first place, we want to be cautious because of the 
assumptions made to derive these results. Secondly, as mentioned above, the tax 
incentive effect we used to estimate the tax revenues could be overstated or 
undervalued, depending on the tax rates of the other affiliated companies in the 
groups. And thirdly, one needs a complete picture of the Spanish companies in 
 
Table 9: The impact on Spain’s tax revenue of eliminating profit shifting activity,  
2005–2014 (€ thousand) 
 
Spanish 
CIT rate 
Reported 
Profits 
Actual 
Profits 
Difference  
in Profits 
Difference  
in CIT revenues 
2005 0.35 4,550,121.12 4,686,129.84 136,008.71 47,603.05 
2006 0.35 6,885,672.07 7,387,158.11 501,486.03 175,520.11 
2007 0.325 7,972,168.03 8,059,932.89 87,764.86 28,523.58 
2008 0.3 6,832,294.57 6,578,175.49 -254,119.07 -76,235.72 
2009 0.3 7,307,299.21 6,999,731.71 -307,567.50 -92,270.25 
2010 0.3 7,669,336.8 7,426,842.45 -242,494.34 -72,748.30 
2011 0.3 6,828,087.5 6,638,790.48 -189,297.02 -56,789.10 
2012 0.3 9,480,885.69 9,637,057.11 156,171.42 46,851.42 
2013 0.3 7,107,661.71 7,069,800.34 -37,861.36 -11,358.40 
2014 0.3 10,910,274.8 12,225,958 1,315,683.23 394,704.96 
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order to evaluate the actual tax revenue consequences for Spain. This means that 
the same analysis needs to be performed for a symmetric representative sample of 
foreign companies owned by Spanish parent companies.  
Despite the caveats we pointed out with regard to the tax revenue results, it is 
worth examining and explaining the figures behind them. To make it easier to 
follow the explanation we added Appendix 2, which contains more disaggregated 
information about these results. 
Tax revenue results depend on the level of the CIT rate of the main investor 
countries in Spain, in comparison to the Spanish rate. As a first step, if we look at 
the evolution of the number of (Spanish subsidiary companies) observations by 
parent company’s country and year (Table A2.1 of Appendix 2), this gives us a 
preliminary idea of which countries have the most influence on the results. United 
States has the highest number of observations for all years (as also shown in Table 
1, it is the most important country in terms of location of parent companies).  
As shown in Table A2.3 of Appendix 2, the US tax rate is higher than the 
Spanish one over the whole sample period. That must mean that there are also 
other important foreign investor countries in Spain which have a low CIT rate. If 
not, results from the elimination of PS would have been negative in all years. We 
can see that the number of observations is also high for Germany, Luxembourg, 
Japan, France and the United Kingdom, which according to Table 1 are the other 
important countries in terms of location of parent companies.  
Disaggregated data on the differences in profits from eliminating the effect of 
PS behaviour (differences between actual and reported profits) by parent company 
country and year can be seen in Table A2.2 of Appendix 2. Particularly, this table 
shows the percentage of total differences that these differences account for, where 
a positive sign indicates that PS was harmful for Spain (because the Spanish tax 
rate was higher than the foreign tax rate and thus Spain could have earned 
additional euros if PS had not existed) and a negative sign that it had a positive 
effect on reported profits (because the Spanish tax rate was lower than the foreign 
tax rate). The highest positive differences from eliminating the PS effect come 
from the United Kingdom (all years but 2005, 2008 and 2013) and Switzerland 
(for the years 2005, 2008 and 2013), notably the positive difference in 2014 
coming from the United Kingdom (which represents 106.98% of the positive 
difference of that year). Another crucial country in terms of shifting profits out of 
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Spain is Ireland. On the other hand, the highest negative differences come from the 
US.  
Table A2.3 and Table A2.4 of Appendix 2 display separately each of the two 
components responsible for these differences in profits. Table A2.3 displays the 
nominal CIT rates of the parent companies’ country over the years10 and Table 
A2.4 contains information about the Spanish reported profits by parent company’s 
country and year. We can conclude that the main countries responsible for the 
results are the United Kingdom, with a harmful effect of PS on Spanish reported 
profits, and the United States with a beneficial one. These are the countries with 
the highest volume of reported profits in Spain, especially the very high percentage 
of 52.32% for the United Kingdom in 2014, which justifies the positive result in 
terms of tax revenues of removing PS shown in Table 9. 
5.3 EU subsidiary companies 
We also estimated a Fixed Effect model for this other sample of EU subsidiaries. 
Table 10 shows the results. 
As shown in Table 10, the effect of the tax incentive is similar to that obtained 
from the larger sample of Spanish subsidiaries. Taxes affect reported profits 
negatively and the semi-elasticity estimated is 2.99. If the tax rate difference (the 
EU tax rate minus the Spanish tax rate) increases by 10% points, reported profits 
in the respective EU country decrease by 29.9%. As in the previous sample, one 
needs to be cautious with this result. Our tax incentive measure always compares 
the foreign tax rates to the Spanish one (and in this case the foreign tax rates are 
only those of the EU) and is only based on the tax rates of two of the countries 
where multinational groups operate. 
The evaluation of the results in terms of tax revenues makes no sense for this 
other sample because it is not symmetric to the earlier one. However, in order to 
have comparable results for the two samples of companies relating to Spain, i.e. 
national and foreign MNE, we additionally estimated a smaller symmetric sample 
of Spanish subsidiaries owned exclusively by EU countries. Again, we got a very 
 
_________________________ 
10 According to Table A3.3 the highest tax rate difference is reached in 2005 and 2006. This is the 
difference with Cyprus when the Cypriot tax rate was 10% and the Spanish one 35%. 
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Table 10: Basic Results 
LnL 0.54 (7.12)*** lnK 0 (0.31)  TEU − TES -2.99 (-1.98)** 
In(GDP pc) -0.65 
(-0.86) 
N 1,648 R2 0.09 
Subsidiary FE Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Note: lnL is the logarithm of the cost of employees; lnK is the logarithm of the fixed assets; TEU −TES is the difference between the tax rate of the EU country where the subsidiary company is situated 
and the Spanish tax rate; and In (GDP pc) is the logarithm of the GDP pc of the country where the 
subsidiary company is located. Subsidiary Fixed Effects and Year dummies are also included and 
estimations are Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations. ***, ** and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
similar negative semi-elasticity of 2.94 for the Spain-EU limited scenario. Results 
for this limited sample can be seen in Appendix 3. 
Consequently, the effect of taxes on reported profits barely changes when we 
exclude the OECD (and non-EU) countries from the calculation of the tax 
incentive. Taking into account the disaggregated figures of Appendix 2, for this 
limited sample of Spanish subsidiaries we can predict more positive results in 
terms of tax revenues for Spain, since the most important countries in terms of 
reported profits are the United Kingdom and the United States, and the latter is 
excluded from the calculation of the tax incentive. The same more positive results 
can be foreseen for the sample of EU subsidiaries since its estimated semi-
elasticity is also very similar.  
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6 Additional analyses and robustness tests  
This section includes some additional analyses and robustness tests to check the 
consistency of our results and to analyse the effect of some interesting features 
relating to the companies and the tax incentive. We concentrate on the Spanish 
subsidiaries sample because is the largest one and the sample used to calculate the 
tax revenue results, but similar results can be found in Appendix 4 for the sample 
of EU subsidiaries. 
6.1 Additional explanatory variables 
In the first place the basic model is broadened by adding some other explanatory 
variables which could impact reported profits in a territory. When thinking about 
possible additional variables, it is useful to distinguish between different groups of 
them depending on affiliate, multinational group and country level characteristics. 
Moreover, because our model includes Subsidiary FE, which absorbs the impact of 
subsidiary time-constant variables, and also the effect of other non-subsidiary 
related constant variables, we need to think of factors which show certain trends 
over time.11  
Following the empirical literature, the basic model is broadened by introducing 
two characteristics related to the economic situation of the country: the Spanish 
GDP pc growth and the inflation rate, measured by the consumer price index, both 
taken from the World Bank website12. Regarding the expected impact of these 
variables, if profits are pro-cyclical the effect of GDP pc growth on profits will be 
positive (Lohse and Riedel, 2013:9). More doubts emerge relating to the effect of 
the inflation rate. According to Azémar (2010:240), inflation could also be used as 
an indicator of a country’s macroeconomic instability. Thus, it may have a 
negative impact on reported profits. On the other hand, it may lead to overstating 
companies’ profits and then have a positive impact on reported profits (Loretz and 
Mokkas, 2015:17). 
_________________________ 
11 This is the reason why we did not include the level of productivity of Spain measured by its GDP 
pc. 
12 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators  
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Results are shown in column two of Table 11. The basic model variables and 
particularly the tax incentive are robust to the introduction of the two additional 
variables. For these last variables, the pro-cyclical behaviour of profits is 
confirmed for the GDP pc growth variable and the inflation rate has a negative 
impact, which is in line with the higher instability hypothesis. 
Instead of controlling for the previous two additional explanatory variables, we 
can directly check the impact of the economic crisis on profits by introducing a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 for the years 2008 on (including 2008), and 
zero otherwise. As a consequence of the pro-cyclical behaviour of profits, the 
expected sign of this variable is negative. Moreover, the crisis could have also 
affected reported profits through the tax incentive measure if it had led to taxes 
having a different impact on reported profits. For example, the crisis could have 
facilitated some tax planning strategies to transfer profits. To check this 
hypothesis, we constructed the interaction variable crisis*(TES − TEX). 
Results in column three of Table 11 corroborate our expectations: the crisis 
impacted reported profits negatively. Additionally, column four of Table 11 shows 
that the effect of the tax incentive variable is more negative for the crisis years.  
Besides the crisis variable, there may be other factors modifying the effect of 
the tax incentive on reported profits. We are particularly interested in checking the 
possible distinct effect of taxes depending on the level of intangible assets used by 
companies, on the one hand. And on the other, we intend to test the different effect 
of the tax incentive depending on whether the Spanish tax rate is higher or lower 
than the foreign tax rate, and the level of the tax rate differences. 
First, as mentioned above, intangible assets could facilitate the transfer pricing 
strategy to shift profits because of their uniqueness and the difficulty of setting an 
arm’s length price for them. Here, one could expect taxes to affect reported profits 
more negatively as corporations have a higher level of intangible assets. However, 
as we also remarked in the second section, at the same time intangible assets 
usually have a positive impact on profitability and thus on reported profits. This 
could make companies less sensitive to taxes. 
Concurrently, the use of intangible assets varies throughout the different 
economic sectors. Thus, one way to evaluate the impact of this kind of asset on 
reported profits is to identify economic sectors with a high level of intangible 
assets and evaluate the effect of the tax incentive for them. According to Mas and 
Quesada (2014:66), the sectors in Spain with the highest level of intangible assets 
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in relation to the output they generate are coke and refined petroleum products; 
chemical products; computer, electronic and optical products; and manufacture of 
transport equipment. 
We construct the binary variable Sector, which takes the value of one for 
subsidiaries whose parent companies belong to one of the aforementioned 
economic sectors with a high level of intangible assets, and zero otherwise. We 
take the sector of the parent companies into account, rather than the sector of the 
subsidiaries, because the aggregation process we carried out to construct our 
sample units does not allow us to identify only one economic sector for each 
sample unit. 
Finally, the variable added to the basic model is the interaction term 
Sector*(TES − TEX), whose effect is not determined and will depend on the 
predominant effect of intangible assets on reported profits. 
As presented in column five of Table 11 it seems that companies with a high 
level of intangible assets are less sensitive to PS strategies. Although PS 
opportunities increase in the presence of a high level of intangible assets, in the 
end the positive effect of intangible assets on real profits seems to dominate. 
For the tax incentive effect depending on tax rate levels, in the first place 
according to Dischinger et al. (2014:257–268), PS semi-elasticity from parents to 
affiliates is lower than that from affiliates to parents. If this was true, the tax semi-
elasticity should be higher when the Spanish tax rate is higher than the foreign tax 
rate. In this case the interaction term Hight*(TES − TEX) is generated, where Hight 
is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 when the subsidiary tax rate is 
higher than the parent company tax rate, and zero otherwise. In the second place, it 
is possible that the relationship between tax incentive and PS is not linear. To 
check it the quadratic term (TES − TEX) 2 is generated. 
Results for these two additional tests are in column six and seven of Table 11 
respectively. It seems from our sample of Spanish subsidiaries that neither the 
situation in which the Spanish tax rate is higher than the foreign tax rate and 
profits go from subsidiaries to parent companies, nor the high tax rate differences 
increase the negative impact of taxes on profits.  
Results for the sample of EU subsidiaries can be seen in Table A4.1 of 
Appendix 4. The effects on reported profits from the capital and labour inputs and 
the tax incentive variable also remain comparable to those of the basic 
specification in general terms (the tax incentive variable becomes statistically non-
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significant in column six). However, for this sample the additional explanatory 
variables are not statistically significant except for the crisis variable, which has a 
surprising counter-cyclical effect on reported profits.13 
Table 11: Additional explanatory variables 
 
GDP pc 
growth; 
Inflation 
(2) 
Crisis 
(3) 
Crisis* (TES − TEX) 
(4) 
Sector* (TES − TEX) 
(5) 
Hight* 
( TES − TEX) 
(6) 
( TES − TEX)2 
(7) 
LnL 0.66 
(13.58)*** 
0.66 
(13.58)*** 
0.67 
(13.54)*** 
0.72 
(14.18)*** 
0.67 
(13.59)*** 
0.67 
(13.58)*** lnK 0.05 
(2.38)** 
0.05 
(2.38)** 
0.05 
(2.35)** 
0.02 
(1.00) 
0.05 
(2.37)** 
0.05 
(2.36)** TES − TEX -2.74 (-4.27)*** -2.74 (-4.27)*** -2.20 (-3.09)*** -3.42 (-3.89)*** -3.47 (-4.55)*** -2.66 (-4.06)*** 
GDP pc 
growth 
0.04 
(5.99)*** 
     
Inflation 
-0.02 
(-2.94)*** 
     
Crisis  
-0.26 
(-7.20)*** 
-0.27 
(-7.29)*** 
   
Crisis* (TES − TEX)   -0.66 (-1.85)*    
Sector* (TES − TEX)    2.35 (1.86)*   
Hight* 
( TES − TEX)     1.87 (1.53)  
( TES −TEX)2      4.03 (0.95) 
Table 11 continued 
_________________________ 
13 The effect of the crisis variable becomes negative when we remove the time period binary 
variables from the regression.   
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Table 11 continued 
 
GDP pc 
growth; 
Inflation 
(2) 
Crisis 
(3) 
Crisis* (TES − TEX) 
(4) 
Sector* (TES − TEX) 
(5) 
Hight* 
( TES − TEX) 
(6) 
( TES − TEX)2 
(7) 
N 6,890 6,890 6,890 4,945 6,890 6,890 R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Subsidiary 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: lnL is the logarithm of the cost of employees; lnK is the logarithm of the fixed assets; and TES − TEX is the difference between the Spanish tax rate and the tax rate of the foreign country where 
the parent company is situated. Additionally, in column (2) the GDP pc growth and the inflation rate 
of Spain, measured by the consumer prices index, are included. In columns (3) and (4) the crisis 
binary variable and this last variable plus the interaction term Crisis*(TES − TEX) are respectively 
included. The interaction terms Sector*(TES − TEX) and Hight*( TES − TEX) are respectively added to 
the basic model in columns (5) and (6). Sector is a binary variable that identifies economic sectors of 
parent companies intensive in intangible assets; Hight is a binary variable that identifies situations in 
which the tax rate of the subsidiaries is higher than the tax rate of the respective parent company; in 
column (7) the quadratic term ( TES − TEX)2 is added. All specifications include Subsidiary Fixed 
Effects and Year dummies and estimations are Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations. 
***, ** and * denoting statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
6.2 Alternative indicators of the input variables  
Table 12 presents the results for the initial basic model specification taking 
different combinations of indicators for the capital and labour input variables. 
Total assets (TOAS) and tangible fixed assets (TFAS) are taken as alternative 
indicators for the capital input (our basic indicator being fixed assets, FIAS), and 
number of employees (EMPL) as alternative labour input indicator (our basic 
indicator being the cost of employees, STAF).  
Results for the tax incentive variable are slightly lower than those obtained 
using our preferred indicators for the input variables, when the semi-elasticity 
estimated was of 2.74. The most striking results are related to the introduction of 
the total assets variable, when the coefficient R2 increases and those of the input 
variables change, especially for capital.  
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However, results for the tax incentive variable are somewhat different for the 
sample of EU subsidiaries (Table A4.2 of Appendix 4), for which the highest 
semi-elasticity is reached for the combination of inputs total assets and cost of 
employees (4.11), and for which the tax incentive is not statistically significant for 
the scenario consisting of number of employees/fixed assets and number of 
employees /tangible fixed assets.  
Table 12: Alternative indicators 
 
TOAS, 
STAF 
TFAS, 
STAF 
FIAS, 
EMPL 
TOAS, 
EMPL 
TFAS, 
EMPL 
LnL 0.37 
(8.16)*** 
0.66 
(13.50)*** 
0.58 
(12.60)*** 
0.21 
(4.54)*** 
0.58 
(12.71)*** lnK 0.67 
(17.87)*** 
0.02 
(1.13) 
0.06 
(3.33)*** 
0.75 
(19.94)*** 
0.04 
(2.26)** TES − TEX -2.20 (-3.46)*** -2.58 (-3.99)*** -2.55 (-3.93)*** -2.02 (-3.17)*** -2.47 (-3.78)*** 
N 6,915 6,779 6,729 6,754 6,625 R2 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.07 
Subsidiary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: lnL is the logarithm of the cost of employees or the logarithm of the number of employees, as 
indicated at the first row of the table; lnK is the logarithm of the fixed assets, the logarithm of total 
assets or the logarithm of tangible fixed assets, as indicated at the first row of the table; and TES −TEX is the difference between the Spanish tax rate and the tax rate of the foreign country where the 
parent company is situated. Subsidiary Fixed Effects and Year dummies are also included and 
estimations are Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations. ***, ** and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
7 Conclusions 
This paper describes the PS activity of MNEs, reviewing the empirical literature 
on the subject, and then examining the existence of such activity from the 
perspective of Spain. Particularly, two samples of companies are studied for the 
period 2005–2014. One sample consists of Spanish subsidiaries owned by OECD 
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and EU parent companies, and the other consists of EU subsidiaries owned by 
Spanish companies. 
In line with the empirical literature, indirect evidence consistent with PS is 
obtained. Our results indicate that reported profits in the different territories in 
which a multinational group operates are altered by taxes and the relationship 
between the two variables is negative. When the tax rate differences between 
Spain and the foreign countries vary by one percentage point, reported profits vary 
by around 2.7–3%. 
We also conducted a series of additional analyses and robustness tests, and in 
general terms the tax incentive variable remains similar to the initial result. This is 
true when the model is broadened to include other explanatory variables, or when 
different combinations of the input variables indicators are considered, especially 
for the sample of Spanish subsidiaries. With regard to our preferred sample of 
Spanish subsidiaries, results show that reported profits are pro-cyclical and that the 
recent economic crisis affected reported profits negatively. We also obtained that 
the effect of the tax incentive on profits is less negative when companies have a 
high level of intangible assets, which could be explained by companies being less 
sensitive to taxes when profitability is high. Furthermore, it seems that the 
magnitude of the tax incentive does not depend on the Spanish tax rate being 
higher or lower than the foreign tax rate, nor on the size of the difference in such 
tax rates. 
Results in terms of tax revenues for Spain of this PS activity from the sample 
of Spanish subsidiaries vary over the years and depend on the higher or lower tax 
rate level of the main investor countries in Spain. Actual profits seem to have been 
higher than reported profits during the first years (2005, 2006, 2007) when the 
Spanish tax rate was relatively high, and also in 2012 and 2014 due to the high 
reported profits in Spain originating in the United Kingdom, a country with a 
relatively low CIT rate. The years for which PS activity seems to have had a 
positive impact on Spanish tax revenues (actual profits were lower than reported 
profits) are 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013. The United States is mainly 
responsible for this other result as a consequence of its relatively high CIT rate and 
high reported profits in Spain. 
Finally, some additional analyses related to the tax incentive variable and the 
samples are open to future research. We will try to incorporate the tax rate of other 
affiliated companies into the tax incentive measure as long as PS is an internal 
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activity within multinational groups. And for our samples of companies, we will 
also try to increase the sample of EU subsidiaries to take into account all the 
important countries for Spain in terms of affiliated companies situated there, 
especially the US, and have a complete overview of PS activity in relation to 
Spain. 
 
Acknowledgements  We would like to thank the reviewers and readers of the e-journal Economics 
for their comments and suggestions, and the Government of Aragón and the European Regional 
Development Fund (Public Economics Research Group) for the funding received. Ángela Castillo 
Murciego also thanks the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport for the funding received and the 
European Commission for letting her present a version of this work there. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  31 
References 
Azémar, C. (2010). International corporate taxation and U.S. multinationals’ behaviour: 
An integrated approach. Canadian Journal of Economics 43(1): 232–253.  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01570.x/abstract  
Becker, J., and N. Riedel (2012). Cross-border tax effects on affiliate investment – 
Evidence from European multinationals. European Economic Review 56(3): 436–450. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292111001115  
Blouin, J., Robinson, L., and J. Seidman (2011). Coordination of transfer prices on intra-
firm trade. Tuck School of Business Working Paper 2010–74. Hanover, NH. 
http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/leslie-
robinson/blouinrobinsonseidman.pdf  
Blouin, J., Huizinga, H., Laeven, L., and G. Nicodème (2014). Thin capitalization rules 
and multinational firm capital structure. CESifo Working Paper 4695.  
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_4695.html 
Buettner, T., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U., and G. Wamser (2012). The impact of thin-
capitalization rules on the capital structure of multinational firms. Journal of Public 
Economics 96(11): 930–938.  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272712000710  
Clausing, K.A. (2003). Tax motivated transfer pricing and U.S. intrafirm trade prices. 
Journal of Public Economics 87(9–10): 2207–2223.  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272702000154   
Clausing, K.A. (2009). Multinational firm tax avoidance and tax policy. National Tax 
Journal 62(4): 703–725. https://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/62/4/ntj-v62n04p703-25-
multinational-firm-tax-avoidance.html  
Collins, J., Kemsley, D., and M. Lang (1998). Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and 
earnings valuation. Journal of Accounting Research 36(2): 209–229.  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2491475?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
De Simone, L. (2016). Does a common set of accounting standards affect tax-motivated 
income shifting for multinational firms? Journal of Accounting and Economics 61(1): 
145–165. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410115000464  
Devereux, M.P., and G. Maffini (2007). The impact of taxation on the location of capital, 
firms and profit: A survey of empirical evidence. Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation Working Paper Series 07/02, Said Business School, Oxford. 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Wor
king_Papers/Series_07/WP0702.pdf 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  32 
Dharmapala, D. (2014). What do we know about base erosion and profit shifting? A 
review of the empirical literature. CESifo Working Paper 4612.  
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_4612.html 
Dharmapala, D., and N. Riedel (2013). Earnings shocks and tax-motivated income-
shifting: Evidence from European multinationals. Journal of Public Economics 97(C): 
95–107. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272712000916  
Dischinger, M. (2010). Profit shifting by multinationals: Indirect evidence from European 
micro panel data. University of Munich Discussion Paper. http://www.ecpol.econ.uni-
muenchen.de/downloads/publis/dischinger_publis/dischinger_ps_new1.pdf  
Dischinger, M., Knoll, B., and N. Riedel (2014). The role of headquarters in multinational 
profit shifting strategies. International Tax and Public Finance 21(2): 248–271.  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10797-012-9265-5  
Dischinger, M., and N. Riedel (2011). Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets 
within multinational firms. Journal of Public Economics 95(7): 691–707.  
https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v95y2011i7p691-707.html 
Dyreng, S., and K. Markle (2016). The effect of financial constraints on tax-motivated 
income shifting by U.S. multinationals. Working paper. 
European Commission (2015). A fair and efficient corporate tax system in the European 
Union: 5 Key Areas for Action. Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council. 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/common-consolidated-
corporate-tax-base-ccctb_en  
European Commission (2016a). Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate 
Tax Base. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/common-
consolidated-corporate-tax-base-ccctb_en 
European Commission (2016b). Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:683:FIN  
Fatica, S., Hemmelgarn, T., and G. Nicodème (2012). The debt-equity tax bias: Con-
sequences and solutions. Taxation Papers European Commission 33.  
https://ideas.repec.org/p/tax/taxpap/0033.html 
Grubert, H., and J. Mutti (1991). Taxes, tariffs and transfer pricing in multinational 
corporate decision making. Review of Economics and Statistics 73(2): 285–293. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109519  
  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  33 
Grubert, H. (2003). Intangible income, intercompany transactions, income shifting, and the 
choice of location. National Tax Journal 56(1): 221–242. 
https://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/56/1/ntj-v56n01p221-42-intangible-income-
intercompany-transactions.html  
Grubert, H. (2012). Foreign taxes and the growing share of U.S. multinational company 
income Abroad: profits, not sales, are being globalized. National Tax Journal 65(2): 
247–282. http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/65/2/ntj-v65n02p247-81-foreign-taxes-growing-
share.pdf 
Heckemeyer, J.H., and M. Overesch (2013). Multinationals’ profit response to tax 
differentials: Effect size and shifting channels. ZEW Discussion Paper 13–045. 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/13045.html 
Hines, J.R. (2014). How serious is the problem of base erosion and profit shifting? 
Canadian Tax Journal 62 (2): 443–453. 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2378&context=articles  
Hines, J.R., and E.M. Rice (1994). Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American 
business. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(1): 149–182.  
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/109/1/149.abstract 
Huizinga, H., and L. Laeven (2006). International profit shifting within multinationals: A 
multi-country perspective. European Economy-Economic Papers 260. Directorate 
General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). European Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication_summary598_en
.htm  
Huizinga, H., and L. Laeven (2008). International profit shifting within multinationals: A 
multi-country perspective. Journal of Public Economics 92(5–6): 1164–1182.  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004727270700182X  
Klassen, K.J., and S.K. Laplante (2012). Are U.S. multinational corporations becoming 
more aggressive income shifters? Journal of Accounting Research 50(5): 1245–1285. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00463.x/abstract  
KPMG (2006). KPMG’s corporate tax rate survey. An international analysis of corporate 
tax rates from 1993 to 2006. KPMG International. 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/articles/KPMGtaxratesurvey.pdf  
Lohse, T., and N. Riedel (2013). Do transfer pricing laws limit international income 
shifting? Evidence from European multinationals. CESifo Working Paper 4404.  
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_4404.html 
  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  34 
Loretz, S., and S. Mokkas (2015). Evidence for profit shifting with tax sensitive capital 
stocks. FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 71(1): 1–36.  
https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/finarc/urnsici0015-2218(201503)711_1efpswt_2.0.tx_2-
3.html 
Markle, K.S. (2016). A comparison of the tax-motivated income shifting of multinationals 
in territorial and worldwide countries. Contemporary Accounting Research 33(1): 
7–43. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1911-3846.12148/epdf 
Mas, M., and J. Quesada (2014). Activos intangibles. Una inversión necesaria para el 
crecimiento económico en España. Published by Ariel and Fundación Telefónica, in 
collaboration with Planeta. 
McDonald, M. (2008). Income shifting from transfer pricing: Further evidence from tax 
return data. OTA Technical Working Paper 2, Department of the Treasury, 
Washington D.C. 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/TP-
2.pdf 
Mills, L.F., and K.J. Newberry (2004). Do foreign multinational's tax incentives influence 
their U.S. income reporting and debt policy? National Tax Journal 57(1): 89–107. 
http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/57/1/ntj-v57n01p89-107-foreign-multinationals-tax-
incentives.pdf 
OECD (2015). 2015 Final Reports, OECD/G20 base erosion and profit shifting project, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Schwarz, P. (2009). Tax-avoidance strategies of American multinationals: An empirical 
analysis. Managerial and Decision Economics 30(8): 539–549.  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.1471/abstract  
Weichenrieder, A.J. (2009). Profit shifting in the EU: Evidence from Germany. 
International Tax and Public Finance 16(3): 281–297.  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10797-008-9068-x  
 
 
 
 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  35 
Appendix 1: Review of the empirical literature on profit shifting 
activity of multinational enterprises motivated by 
corporate income taxes. Hines and Rice approach 
 Samplea Profits and  Tax Incentive 
Real Economic  
Activity and FE 
Additional  Control Variables 
and Additional Analyses 
A
zé
m
ar
 (2
01
0)
 
Treasury Corporate Tax 
Files; 
1992,1994,1996,1998 and 
2000; 
 
Resultsb*: 2.75 
Ln (Pre-tax profits); 
 
Tax rate (average tax 
rate) 
Ln (Total assets); 
Ln(GDP pc) 
 
Country FE; Year FE 
Country: Ln (GDP); Ln (Trade 
openness); Ln (Inflation); Ln 
(Exchange rate); Ln (Physical 
infrastructure); Law and order 
index and an interaction term 
with the tax incentive; 
 
Taxes effect on repatriated 
dividends and Subpart F 
income 
B
ec
ke
r 
an
d 
R
ie
de
l (
20
12
) AMADEUS; 1995-2006; 
 
Results*: 0.78 
Ln (Pre-tax profits); 
 
Simple tax rate 
difference (statutory 
tax rate) 
Ln(Fixed assets); 
Ln(GDP pc) 
 
Industry FE; Year FE 
Country: Ln(Population 
subsidiaries); 
Ln(Unemployment 
subsidiaries); Ln(Population 
parents);  
Ln(Unemployment parents); 
Ln(GDP pc parents) 
B
lo
ui
n 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
1)
 
BEA; 1982-2005; 
 
Results*: 0.31 
Ln (Pre-tax profits); 
 
Simple tax rate 
difference (foreign 
marginal tax rate and 
US statutory tax 
rate) 
Ln (Cost of employ- 
ees); 
Ln (Total assets); 
Ln (GDP pc); 
 
Industry FE; Year FE 
 
MNE: Conflicting situation 
(trade-off between minimising 
CITs and customs duties) 
dummy and an interaction 
term with the tax incentive 
C
la
us
in
g 
(2
00
9)
 
BEA; 1982-2004; 
 
Results*: 3.39 
Pre-tax profits/Sales;  
 
Simple tax rate dif-
ference (effective tax 
rate) 
Through the deno-
minator of the depen-
dent variable 
 
 
PS effect on US revenue 
collection 
D
e 
Si
m
on
e 
(2
01
6)
 
AMADEUS; 2003-2012; 
 
Results*: 0.74 
Ln (Pre-tax profits); 
 
Weighted tax rate 
difference (statutory 
tax rate and taking 
operating revenues 
as the weighting fac-
tor) 
Ln (Cost of employ-
ees); 
Ln (Tangible fixed 
assets); 
Ln (GDP pc); 
 
Country FE; Year FE; 
Industry FE 
 
Affiliate: Observations that are 
listed dummy; Observations 
that are listed as the GUO 
dummy; 
Country: Interaction term 
between the adoption of a 
common set of accounting 
standards dummy and the tax 
incentive 
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D
is
ch
in
ge
r 
(2
01
0)
 
AMADEUS; 1995-2005; 
 
Results*: 1.6 
Ln (Pre-tax pro 
fits/Number of em-
ployees);  
 
TR (statutory tax 
rate); Simple tax rate 
difference (statutory 
tax rate) 
Ln (Cost of employ-
ees/Number of 
employees); 
Ln (Fixed assets/ 
Number of employ-
ees); 
Ln (GDP pc); 
 
Affiliate FE; Year FE 
 
Affiliate: Debt ratio; 
MNE: Ownership share and an 
interaction term with the tax 
incentive; 
Country: Ln (GDP); Ln 
(Unemployment); Ln (Corrup-
tion index) 
D
is
ch
in
ge
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
4)
 
AMADEUS; 1995-2007; 
 
Results**: 0.5 
Ln (Pre-tax profits); 
 
Simple tax rate dif-
ference (statutory tax 
rate) 
Ln(Cost of 
employees); 
Ln(Fixed assets); 
Ln(GDP pc); 
 
Affiliate FE; Year 
FE; Industry FE 
 
Affiliate: Log (Subsidiary total 
assets /Parent company total 
assets) and an interaction term 
with the tax incentive; 
MNE: Ln (Number of entities 
in the corporate group) and an 
interaction term with the tax 
incentive; 
Country: High tax subsidiary 
dummy and an interaction term 
with the tax incentive; Cor-
ruption; Log(GDP) 
D
is
ch
in
ge
r 
an
d 
R
ie
de
l (
20
11
) 
AMADEUS; 1995-2005; 
 
Results*: 3.2 
Ln (Pre-tax profits); 
 
Simple tax rate dif-
ference (tax rate of 
the considered sub-
sidiary minus the 
unweighted average 
tax rate of all other 
group members, sub-
sidiaries and the 
parent company) 
Ln (Cost of 
employees); 
Ln (Fixed assets); 
GDP pc; 
 
Affiliate FE; Year FE 
MNE: Interaction term between 
the intangible intensity at low 
tax affiliates dummy and the 
tax incentive; Interaction term 
between the difference in 
intangibles intensity at low and 
high tax affiliates within the 
group variable and the tax 
incentive; 
Country: Country R&D 
expenses(%GDP); Population; 
Corruption index; GDP pc 
growth; Unemployment; 
 
Taxes effect on intangible 
assets location 
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G
ru
be
rt
 (2
00
3)
 
Treasury Corporate Tax 
Files; 1996; 
 
Results*: 0.8 
Pre-tax profits/Sales; 
 
Tax rate (statutory 
tax rate) 
Assets/Sales; 
GDP pc; 
 
 
Affiliate: age<5 years; age 5-15 
years; Debt/Asset; 
MNE: Parent R&D/Sales; 
Parent advertising/Sales; Parent 
domestic profits/Sales; an inter-
action terms with the tax in-
centive; Ln (Parent sales); 
 
The links between intangible 
income, intercompany trans-
actions, income shifting and the 
choice of location; Main PS 
strategies 
G
ru
be
rt
 (2
01
2)
 
Treasury Corporate Tax 
Files; 1996 and 2004; 
 
Results*: 1.29 
Change in Pre-tax 
Profits/Sales 
 
Change in tax rate 
(MNE’s Average 
Effective Foreign tax 
rate) 
 
Through the denomi-
nator of the depen-
dent variable 
Affiliate: A dummy for 
companies incorporated after 
1980; Ln (Sales), 1996; Change 
in worldwide profis/Sales; 
MNE: Parent R&D/Sales, 2004; 
Parent advertising/Sales, 2004; 
Interaction term with the tax 
incentive; 
Country: Average effective 
foreign TR 1996  
 
Explanation on the growing 
share of U.S. MNE income 
abroad from the firm level 
results 
G
ru
be
rt
 a
nd
 M
ut
ti 
(1
99
1)
 
BEA; 1982; 
 
Results**: 0.37 
Post-tax 
profits/Sales;  
Post-tax 
profits/Equity; 
 
Tax rate (statutory 
tax rate; average 
effective tax rate) 
Through the 
denominator of the 
dependent variable; 
 
Country: GDP growth rate 
between 1975 and 1982 
H
in
es
 a
nd
 
R
ic
e 
(1
99
4)
 BEA; 1982; 
 
Results*: 12.29 
 
 
Ln (Pre-tax 
earnings); Ln (Pre-
tax profits); 
 
Tax rate (average tax 
rate) 
Ln (Cost of employ-
ees); 
Ln (Fixed assets); 
Ln (GDP pc) 
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H
ui
zi
ng
a 
an
d 
L
ae
ve
n 
(2
00
8)
 
AMADEUS; 1999; 
 
Results*: 1.21 
Ln (Pre-tax 
earnings);  
 
Weighted tax rate 
difference (statutory 
tax rate and taking 
sales as the weight-
ing factor) 
Ln (Cost of 
employees); 
Ln (Fixed assets); 
Ln (GDP pc); 
 
Industry FE 
 
Affiliate: A dummy variable 
indicating Eastern European 
firms and an interaction term 
with the tax incentive; Total 
debt/Total assets; 
Country: Corruption 
L
oh
se
 a
nd
 R
ie
de
l 
(2
01
3)
 
AMADEUS; 1999-2009; 
 
Results**: 0.4 
Ln (Pre-tax 
earnings);  
 
Tax rate (statutory 
tax rate);  
Ln (Cost of employ-
ees); 
Ln (Fixed assets); 
GDP pc; 
 
Affiliate FE; 
Industry-year FE; 
Country: Transfer Pricing rules 
and interaction terms with the 
tax incentive; GDP; GDP 
growth; Unemployment; Cor-
ruption; Linear time trend and 
an interaction term with the tax 
incentive 
L
or
et
z 
an
d 
M
ok
ka
s 
(2
01
5)
 
AMADEUS; 2003-2011; 
 
Results**: 0.06 
Post-tax 
profits/Total assets;  
 
Tax rate (statutory 
tax rate) 
Ln (Number of em-
ployees); 
Ln (Tangible assets) 
 
Affiliate FE; Year FE 
Affiliate: Share intangibles; 
Leverage; 
Country: GDP pc growth; 
Ln(Inflation); Interest rate; 
Corruption index 
M
ar
kl
e 
(2
01
6)
 
ORBIS; 2004-2008; 
 
Results**: 0.94 
Ln (Pre-tax profits); 
 
Weighted average 
tax rate (statutory 
tax rate and taking 
operating revenues 
as the weighting 
factor) 
Ln (Cost of employ-
ees); 
Ln (Tangible fixed 
assets); 
Ln (GDP pc); 
 
Parent company FE; 
Year FE 
 
Country: Home country tax-
ation dummy and an interaction 
term with the tax incentive 
M
cD
on
al
d 
(2
00
8)
 Treasury Corporate Tax 
Files; 1996, 2000 and 
2002; 
 
Results*: 1.23 
Pre-tax 
earnings/Sales; 
 
Tax rate (statutory 
tax rate) 
Assets/Sales Affiliate: age<5 years; age 5-15 
years; 
MNE: Parent R&D/Sales; 
Parent advertising/Sales; Parent 
domestic profits/Sales; Ln 
(Parent sales). Cost sharing 
arrangements and an interaction 
term with the tax incentive 
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M
ill
s a
nd
 N
ew
be
rr
y 
(2
00
4)
 Treasury Corporate Tax 
Files; 1987-1996; 
 
Results*: 1.94 
Pre-tax 
profits/Assets; Pre-
tax profits/Sales; 
 
Simple tax rate 
difference (US stat-
utory tax rate and 
average tax rate of 
the foreign parent 
company, excluding 
US; statutory tax 
rate) 
Through the denomi-
nator of the depen-
dent variable; 
 
Year FE; Industry 
FE; Parent country 
FE 
Affiliate: Altman’s bankruptcy 
predictor score; Age; 
Sales/Worldwide sales; 
MNE: Intangible assets/Assets; 
Pre-tax profits/Assets; 
 
Tax incentive effect on the debt 
levels 
Sc
hw
ar
z 
(2
00
9)
 BEA; 1999-2001; 
 
Results*: 2.27 
Pre-tax profits/Sales; 
Pre-tax 
profits/Assets; 
 
Tax rate (statutory 
tax rate; effective tax 
rate) 
Through the denomi-
nator of the depen-
dent variable; 
 
 
Country: GDP growth; Political 
risk;  
 
Replacing the dependent 
variable by Equity 
capital/(Equity capital +debt) 
and Retained earnings/Stocks 
W
ei
ch
en
ri
ed
er
 
(2
00
9)
 
MiDi; 1996-2003; 
 
Results*: 0.80 
Post-tax 
profits/Total assets; 
 
Tax rate 
Ln (Employment), 
Ln (Fixed assets); 
 
Affiliate FE; Year FE 
 
Affiliate: Ln (Sales); 
Debt/Total assets; Ownership 
percentage dummy and an 
interaction term with the tax 
incentive; 
Country: GDP growth; 
Domestic private credit/GDP 
Notes: 
a Databases information: 
AMADEUS. Accounting consolidated and unconsolidated data on private and publicly owned European firms as 
well as on their ownership relationships. 
ORBIS. Accounting consolidated and unconsolidated data on private and publicly owned worldwide firms as well 
as on their ownership relationships. 
MiDi. Inward and outward German multinationals data on a set of balance sheet items (including yearly profit 
after taxes but before dividend distributions as a separate part of the equity of the firm), plus data on sales and 
employees and microdata on FDI.  
BEA. Financial and operating data on U.S. multinational corporations.  
Treasury Corporate Tax Files. Financial data on the 7,500 largest foreign corporations controlled by U.S. 
multinationals.  
Compustat. Financial data on US MNEs. 
b Results indicate the estimated coefficient of the effect of the tax incentive variable on reported profits multiplied 
by (-1). * denoting mean semi-elasticities summarized in Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) and ** denoting 
results taken directly from the original studies. Particularly, results taken from Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) 
refer to semi-elasticities when profit is used as the dependent variable. There is an exception regarding the study 
of McDonald (2008) because these authors only use earnings before interest and taxes as the measure of the 
dependent variable. Regarding the five study’s results not taken from Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), 
estimates are not always semi-elasticities and thus, they are not always comparable. Furthermore, the point 
estimates we reported for them belong to the specifications more similar to the one we adopt in this paper. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Appendix 2: Some explanatory figures of the tax revenue results 
Table A2.1. Evolution of the number of observations by parent company’s country  
and year 
GUO  
country 
-ISO code- 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AT 4 6 5 5 4 5 1 2 3 5 
AU 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 
BE 16 16 14 18 16 20 21 20 19 19 
CA 12 13 13 13 13 15 12 14 13 10 
CH 25 27 28 25 22 27 23 26 34 23 
CL 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
CY 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 
CZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
DE 70 74 77 69 64 81 81 76 83 71 
DK 14 15 15 18 17 18 21 22 23 16 
FI 8 8 8 7 7 8 7 7 7 6 
FR 46 55 54 48 51 60 61 70 63 50 
GB 55 56 56 57 57 66 64 68 62 50 
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
IE 9 12 12 10 10 10 9 13 7 8 
IL 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 4 3 
IS 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
IT 32 34 34 31 31 40 35 32 36 34 
JP 55 59 60 59 54 65 65 56 65 33 
KR 1 3 4 3 6 4 3 5 6 6 
LU 64 66 69 59 66 77 75 67 76 76 
MT 1 2 3 1 2 4 3 4 4 3 
MX 3 4 1 3 4 5 5 3 7 5 
NL 44 41 42 42 36 51 47 48 51 42 
NO 3 5 5 5 2 5 5 4 5 5 
NZ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PL 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 
PT 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 7 5 
SE 9 10 10 10 9 12 11 11 11 12 
SI 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
SK 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
TR 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 
US 172 185 189 189 191 214 214 213 208 147  
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Table A2.2. Difference in profits by parent company’s country and year 
(% of total difference in profits) 
GUO  
country- 
ISO code- 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AT 1.11 8.13 2.76 1.74 0.20 0.31 0.15 18.23 2.30 0.15 
AU 0.21 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BE 1.20 0.34 -2.57 -2.42 -1.05 -2.33 -4.29 -5.12 -22.24 -0.50 
CA -0.75 -0.54 -9.70 -2.95 -2.88 -1.41 4.55 19.31 70.93 1.85 
CH 112.37 37.96 197.69 83.21 30.43 24.90 30.25 48.68 317.58 3.35 
CL 0.43 0.22 1.49 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.23 0.36 2.02 0.04 
CY 2.66 1.17 4.86 0.94 2.58 1.83 1.52 1.31 56.55 0.02 
CZ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 3.16 0.00 
DE -44.71 -11.53 -99.43 3.09 2.51 5.80 10.78 11.65 35.71 1.02 
DK 2.16 1.55 27.10 7.30 6.32 8.21 3.67 6.73 28.16 0.56 
FI 6.80 1.70 7.44 1.82 1.11 0.73 0.99 0.65 5.30 0.33 
FR 9.82 6.84 -28.73 -48.49 -19.35 -68.89 -30.39 -63.39 -297.81 -6.58 
GB 61.08 58.17 217.00 0.00 43.44 39.78 65.23 216.80 311.05 106.98 
GR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.01 
IE 46.19 20.01 91.21 20.67 17.96 33.14 42.10 112.69 158.04 5.06 
IL 0.11 0.01 0.64 3.87 1.26 1.41 8.80 8.60 0.25 0.01 
IS 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
IT -6.11 -0.72 -11.88 -1.65 -1.17 -2.92 -2.66 -3.94 -19.18 -0.56 
JP -28.33 -7.94 -84.94 -24.31 -18.83 -27.47 -35.26 -24.87 -134.42 -1.03 
KR 0.06 0.32 1.80 0.08 1.59 3.55 5.77 12.78 26.19 0.39 
LU 17.07 8.07 34.70 0.97 4.18 4.37 8.96 8.24 35.55 1.28 
MT 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.01 -0.20 -0.32 -0.68 -0.61 -4.49 -0.07 
MX 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NL 18.04 6.78 45.14 13.61 5.35 17.56 26.70 26.27 197.49 2.13 
NO 0.34 0.15 0.54 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.25 3.92 0.06 
Table A2.2 continued 
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Table A2.2 continued 
GUO  
country- 
ISO code- 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
NZ 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.01 
PL 0.25 0.56 1.34 0.55 0.92 0.47 0.26 0.39 1.97 0.05 
PT 5.73 1.75 11.56 3.12 2.10 2.98 2.51 44.57 29.49 1.72 
SE 14.76 3.28 12.14 0.77 1.40 1.12 4.45 3.40 37.46 1.58 
SI 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.01 
SK 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.00 
TR 0.40 0.10 0.79 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
US -121.40 -36.60 -320.79 -162.53 -178.48 -143.11 -244.40 -343.51 -945.67 -17.88 
Note: This table shows for each year the percentage that a country’s difference between actual and reported profits stands for on the sum of all countries’ positive or negative difference. A negative 
(positive) sign indicates that for that residence country and year, actual profits in Spain were lower (higher) than reported profits and so, that PS was beneficial (harmful) for Spain. 
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Table A2.3. Spanish and Parent companies’ country Corporate Income Tax Rates 
Country 
-ISO code- 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AT 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
AU 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
BE 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
CA 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.27 
CH 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
CL 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 
CY 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 
CZ 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
DE 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 
DK 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
EE 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
FI 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.20 
FR 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
GB 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 
GR 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.26 
IE 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
IL 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.27 
IS 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
IT 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
JP 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.36 
KR 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 
LU 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
MT 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
MX 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
NL 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
NO 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 
NZ 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
PL 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
PT 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23 
SE 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.22 
SI 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.17 
SK 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.22 
TR 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
US 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
MEAN 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
ES 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
ES-MEAN 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Note: This table shows the highest marginal nominal CIT Rate, including local taxes. Information 
comes from KPMG (2006) and the KPMG website http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-
tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx. 
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Table A2.4. Reported profits by parent company’s country and year  
(% of total reported profits) 
GUO  
country 
-ISO code- 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AT 0.12 2.16 0.15 0.47 0.06 0.07 0.03 2.19 0.09 0.13 
AU 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.04 
BE 1.30 0.91 0.69 0.82 0.40 0.67 1.09 0.77 1.08 0.56 
CA 0.74 1.30 1.08 1.15 1.47 1.63 2.30 2.90 3.45 2.33 
CH 8.95 7.36 6.69 10.47 4.23 2.55 2.62 2.45 5.15 1.22 
CL 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
CY 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.63 0.01 
CZ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
DE 14.73 9.18 6.82 8.56 6.87 11.34 17.31 13.47 15.43 10.66 
DK 0.34 0.59 1.45 1.98 1.94 1.90 0.74 0.81 1.10 0.45 
FI 0.82 0.50 0.46 0.62 0.42 0.21 0.25 0.07 0.19 0.15 
FR 9.15 10.89 13.91 19.77 8.93 23.87 9.23 11.44 17.39 8.70 
GB 13.33 30.92 34.87 16.56 33.36 22.95 16.50 21.72 8.64 52.32 
GR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
IE 2.24 2.36 1.83 1.60 1.58 2.19 2.43 3.87 1.76 1.27 
IL 0.12 0.01 0.07 1.75 0.48 0.32 1.48 1.03 0.01 0.02 
IS 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IT 2.96 0.85 1.00 1.60 1.28 2.41 1.92 1.69 2.66 1.74 
JP 5.43 3.71 4.17 3.09 2.71 2.96 3.34 1.87 3.26 0.81 
KR 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.42 0.71 0.73 1.32 0.88 0.29 
LU 4.03 3.99 4.86 3.57 4.55 3.58 7.56 4.13 8.86 7.24 
MT 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.06 
MX 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.35 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.44 0.16 
NL 5.62 3.34 2.59 4.11 1.83 4.50 5.40 3.16 7.68 1.88 
NO 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.38 0.08 
NZ 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
PL 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
PT 0.83 0.62 0.62 0.85 0.64 0.69 0.51 5.36 1.15 1.08 
SE 2.30 1.25 1.08 0.52 0.58 0.35 1.22 0.55 0.91 0.87 
SI 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SK 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
TR 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
US 26.49 19.45 17.19 22.06 27.42 16.51 24.73 20.65 18.38 7.87 
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Appendix 3: Results for limited Spanish subsidiaries sample 
lnL 0.63 
(9.99)*** lnK 0.04 
(1.47)  TES − TEX -2.94 (-3.94)*** 
N 3,931 R2 0.11 
Subsidiary FE Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Note: lnL is the logarithm of the cost of employees; lnK is the logarithm of the fixed assets; and TES − TEX is the difference between the Spanish tax rate and the tax rate of the foreign country where 
the parent company is situated. Subsidiary Fixed Effects and Year dummies are also included and 
estimations are Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations. ***, ** and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
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Appendix 4: Additional analyses and robustness tests for the 
sample of EU subsidiaries 
Table A4.1. Additional explanatory variables 
 
GDP pc 
growth; 
Inflation 
(2) 
Crisis 
(3) 
Crisis* (TEU − TES) 
(4) 
Sector* (TEU − TES) 
(5) 
Hight* (TEU − TES) 
(6) 
( TEU − TES)2 
(7) 
LnL 0.55 
(7.32)*** 
0.54 
(7.12)*** 
0.54 
(7.10)*** 
0.53 
(6.56)*** 
0.54 
(7.11)*** 
0.54 
(7.14)*** lnK 0 (0.32) 0 (0.31) 0 (0.32) 0 (0.16) 0 (0.32) 0 (0.31) 
In(GDP pc) -0.80 (-1.06) 
-0.65 
(-0.86) 
-0.96 
(-1.24) 
-0.38 
(-0.46) 
-0.67 
(-0.88) 
-0.69 
(-0.91) TEU − TES -3.09 (-2.06)** -2.99 (-1.98)** -2.61 (-1.66)* -2.99 (-1.96)** -1.96 (-0.90) -3.14 (-2.07)** 
GDP pc 
growth 
0.01 
(0.67)      
Inflation -0.04 (-1.53)      
Crisis  0.18 (1.88)* 
0.14 
(1.40)    
Crisis* (TEU − TES)   -1.03 (-0.97)    
Sector* (TEU − TES)    16.99 (1.47)   
Hight* (TEU − TES)     -2.73 (-0.90)  
( TEU − TES)2      -2.46 (-0.18) 
N 1,648 1,648 1,648 1,474 1,648 1,648 R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Subsidiary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: lnL is the logarithm of the cost of employees; lnK is the logarithm of the fixed assets; TEU −TES is the difference between the tax rate of the EU country where the subsidiary company is situated 
and the Spanish tax rate. Additionally, in column (2) the GDP pc growth and the inflation rate of the 
subsidiary company country, measured by the consumer prices index, are included. In columns (3) 
and (4) the crisis binary variable and this last variable plus the interaction term Crisis*(TEU − TES) 
are respectively included. The interaction terms Sector*(TEU − TES) and Hight*( TEU − TES) are 
respectively added to the basic model in columns (5) and (6). Sector is a binary variable that 
identifies economic sectors of parent companies intensive in intangible assets; Hight is a binary 
variable that identifies situations in which the tax rate of the subsidiaries is higher than the tax rate of 
the respective parent company; in column (7) the quadratic term ( TEU − TES)2 is added. All 
specifications include Subsidiary Fixed Effects and Year dummies and estimations are Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations. ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
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Table A4.2. Alternative indicators 
 ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS 
 
TOAS, 
STAF 
TFAS, 
STAF 
FIAS, 
EMPL 
TOAS, 
EMPL 
TFAS, 
EMPL 
lnL 0.19 
(2.34)** 
0.58 
(7.64)*** 
0.46 
(7.44)*** 
0.14 
(2.30)** 
0.47 
(7.84)*** lnK 0.67 
(9.44)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.96) 
0.05 
(1.62) 
0.77 
(12.24)*** 
0.02 
(0.92) TEU − TES -4.11 (-2.77)*** -2.88 (-1.93)* -1.67 (-1.13) -2.75 (-1.86)* -1.61 (-1.08) 
In(GDP pc) 
-0.74 
(-1.04) 
-0.81 
(-1.06) 
-0.17 
(-0.24) 
-0.91 
(-1.34) 
-0.24 
(-0.34) 
N 1,666 1,640 1,493 1,510 1,490 R2 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.07 
Subsidiary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: lnL is the logarithm of the cost of employees or the logarithm of the number of employees, as 
indicated at the first row of the table; lnK is the logarithm of the fixed assets, the logarithm of total 
assets or the logarithm of tangible fixed assets, as indicated at the first row of the table; TEU − TES is 
the difference between the tax rate of the EU country where the subsidiary company is situated and 
the Spanish tax rate; and In(GDP pc) is the logarithm of the GDP pc of the subsidiary company 
country. Subsidiary Fixed Effects and Year dummies are also included and estimations are Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations. ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
 
 
